Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius — Niccolo Machiavelli — John Shaqi
Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius
Niccolo Machiavelli · en
That its original institutions are no longer adapted to a city that has
become corrupted, is plainly seen in two matters of great moment, I
mean in the appointment of magistrates and in the passing of laws. For
the Roman people conferred the consulship and other great offices of
their State on none save those who sought them; which was a good
institution at first, because then none sought these offices save those
who thought themselves worthy of them, and to be rejected was held
disgraceful; so that, to be deemed worthy, all were on their best
behaviour. But in a corrupted city this institution grew to be most
mischievous. For it was no longer those of greatest worth, but those
who had most influence, who sought the magistracies; while all who were
without influence, however deserving, refrained through fear. This
untoward result was not reached all at once, but like other similar
results, by gradual steps. For after subduing Africa and Asia, and
reducing nearly the whole of Greece to submission, the Romans became
perfectly assured of their freedom, and seemed to themselves no longer
to have any enemy whom they had cause to fear. But this security and
the weakness of their adversaries led them in conferring the
consulship, no longer to look to merit, but only to favour, selecting
for the office those who knew best how to pay court to them, not those
who knew best how to vanquish their enemies. And afterwards, instead of
selecting those who were best liked, they came to select those who had
most influence; and in this way, from the imperfection of their
institutions, good men came to be wholly excluded.
Again, as to making laws, any of the tribunes and certain others of the
magistrates were entitled to submit laws to the people; but before
these were passed it was open to every citizen to speak either for or
against them. This was a good system so long as the citizens were good,
since it is always well that every man should be able to propose what
he thinks may be of use to his country, and that all should be allowed
to express their views with regard to his proposal; so that the people,
having heard all, may resolve on what is best. But when the people grew
depraved, this became a very mischievous institution; for then it was
only the powerful who proposed laws, and these not in the interest of
public freedom but of their own authority; and because, through fear,
none durst speak against the laws they proposed, the people were either
deceived or forced into voting their own destruction.
In order, therefore, that Rome after she had become corrupted might
still preserve her freedom, it was necessary that, as in the course of
events she had made new laws, so likewise she should frame new
institutions, since different institutions and ordinances are needed in
a corrupt State from those which suit a State which is not corrupted;
for where the matter is wholly dissimilar, the form cannot be similar.