But since old institutions must either be reformed all at once, as soon
as they are seen to be no longer expedient, or else gradually, as the
imperfection of each is recognized, I say that each of these two
courses is all but impossible. For to effect a gradual reform requires
a sagacious man who can discern mischief while it is still remote and
in the germ. But it may well happen that no such person is found in a
city; or that, if found, he is unable to persuade others of what he is
himself persuaded. For men used to live in one way are loath to leave
it for another, especially when they are not brought face to face with
the evil against which they should guard, and only have it indicated to
them by conjecture. And as for a sudden reform of institutions which
are seen by all to be no longer good, I say that defects which are
easily discerned are not easily corrected, because for their correction
it is not enough to use ordinary means, these being in themselves
insufficient; but recourse must be had to extraordinary means, such as
violence and arms; and, as a preliminary, you must become prince of the
city, and be able to deal with it at your pleasure. But since the
restoration of a State to new political life presupposes a good man,
and to become prince of a city by violence presupposes a bad man, it
can, consequently, very seldom happen that, although the end be good, a
good man will be found ready to become a prince by evil ways, or that a
bad man having become a prince will be disposed to act virtuously, or
think of turning to good account his ill-acquired authority.
From all these causes comes the difficulty, or rather the
impossibility, which a corrupted city finds in maintaining an existing
free government, or in establishing a new one. So that had we to
establish or maintain a government in that city, it would be necessary
to give it a monarchical, rather than a popular form, in order that men
too arrogant to be restrained by the laws, might in some measure be
kept in check by a power almost absolute; since to attempt to make them
good otherwise would be a very cruel or a wholly futile endeavour.
This, as I have said, was the method followed by Cleomenes; and if he,
that he might stand alone, put to death the Ephori; and if Romulus,
with a like object, put to death his brother and Titus Tatius the
Sabine, and if both afterwards made good use of the authority they thus
acquired, it is nevertheless to be remembered that it was because
neither Cleomenes nor Romulus had to deal with so corrupt a people as
that of which I am now speaking, that they were able to effect their
ends and to give a fair colour to their acts.
CHAPTER XIX.—_After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself:
but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second._