necessary to hold Pistoya in factions, and Pisa with Fortresses; and for
this cause maintaind some towns subject to them in differences, whereby
to hold it more easily. This, at what time Italy was ballanc'd in a
certain manner, might be well done; but mee thinks it cannot now a dayes
be well given for a precept; for I do not beleeve, that divisions made
can do any good; rather it must needs be, that when the enemy approaches
them, Cities divided are presently lost; for alwaies the weaker part
will cleave to the forrein power, and the other not be able to subsist.
The Venetians (as I think) mov'd by the aforesaid reasons, maintaind the
factions of the Guelfes and Gibellins, in their townes; and however they
never suffered them to spill one anothers blood, yet they nourish'd
these differences among them, to the end that the citizens imployd in
these quarrels, should not plot any thing against them: which as it
proved, never serv'd them to any great purpose: for being defeated at
Vayla, presently one of those two factions took courage and seizd upon
their whole State. Therefore such like waies argue the Princes weakness;
for in a strong principality they never will suffer such divisions; for
they shew them some kind of profit in time of peace, being they are able
by means thereof more easily to mannage their subjects: but war comming,
such like orders discover their fallacy. Without doubt, Princes become
great, when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions that are made
against them; and therefore Fortune especially when she hath to make any
new Prince great, who hath more need to gain reputation than an
hereditary Prince, causes enemies to rise against him, and him to
undertake against them: to the end he may have occasion to master them,
and know that ladder, which his enemies have set him upon, whereby to
rise yet higher. And therefore many think, that a wise Prince when he
hath the occasion, ought cunningly to nourish some enmity, that by the
suppressing thereof, his greatness may grow thereupon. Princes,
especially those that are new, have found more faith and profit in those
men, who in the beginning of their State, have been held suspected, than
in those who at their entrance have been their confidents. Pandulphus
Petrucci, Prince of Siena, governd his State, more with them that had
been suspected by him, than with the others. But of this matter we
cannot speak at large, because it varies according to the subject; I
will only say this, that those men, who in the beginning of a
Principality were once enemies, if they be of quality so that to
maintain themselves they have need of support, the Prince might alwaies
with the greatest facility gain for his; and they are the rather forced
to serve him faithfully, insomuch as they know it is more necessary for
them by their deeds to cancel that sinister opinion, which was once held
of them; and so the Prince ever draws from these more advantage, than