A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I
John Stuart Mill · en
But these reflections, so easy to us, would have been difficult to
persons who thought, as most of the later Aristotelians did, that
objects were made what they were called, that gold (for instance) was
made gold, not by the possession of certain properties to which mankind
have chosen to attach that name, but by participation in the nature of
a certain general substance, called gold in general, which substance,
together with all the properties that belonged to it, _inhered_ in every
individual piece of gold.[23] As they did not consider these universal
substances to be attached to all general names, but only to some, they
thought that an object borrowed only a part of its properties from an
universal substance, and that the rest belonged to it individually: the
former they called its essence, and the latter its accidents. The
scholastic doctrine of essences long survived the theory on which it
rested, that of the existence of real entities corresponding to general
terms; and it was reserved for Locke at the end of the seventeenth
century, to convince philosophers that the supposed essences of classes
were merely the signification of their names; nor, among the signal
services which his writings rendered to philosophy, was there one more
needful or more valuable.
Now, as the most familiar of the general names by which an object is
designated usually connotes not one only, but several attributes of the
object, each of which attributes separately forms also the bond of union
of some class, and the meaning of some general name; we may predicate of
a name which connotes a variety of attributes, another name which
connotes only one of these attributes, or some smaller number of them
than all. In such cases, the universal affirmative proposition will be
true; since whatever possesses the whole of any set of attributes, must
possess any part of that same set. A proposition of this sort, however,
conveys no information to any one who previously understood the whole
meaning of the terms. The propositions, Every man is a corporeal being,
Every man is a living creature, Every man is rational, convey no
knowledge to any one who was already aware of the entire meaning of the
word _man_, for the meaning of the word includes all this: and that
every _man_ has the attributes connoted by all these predicates, is
already asserted when he is called a man. Now, of this nature are all
the propositions which have been called essential. They are, in fact,
identical propositions.