A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I
John Stuart Mill · en
This view of the functions of the syllogism is confirmed by the
consideration of precisely those cases which might be expected to be
least favourable to it, namely, those in which ratiocination is
independent of any previous induction. We have already observed that the
syllogism, in the ordinary course of our reasoning, is only the latter
half of the process of travelling from premises to a conclusion. There
are, however, some peculiar cases in which it is the whole process.
Particulars alone are capable of being subjected to observation; and all
knowledge which is derived from observation, begins, therefore, of
necessity, in particulars; but our knowledge may, in cases of certain
descriptions, be conceived as coming to us from other sources than
observation. It may present itself as coming from testimony, which, on
the occasion and for the purpose in hand, is accepted as of an
authoritative character: and the information thus communicated, may be
conceived to comprise not only particular facts but general
propositions, as when a scientific doctrine is accepted without
examination on the authority of writers, or a theological doctrine on
that of Scripture. Or the generalization may not be, in the ordinary
sense, an assertion at all, but a command; a law, not in the
philosophical, but in the moral and political sense of the term: an
expression of the desire of a superior, that we, or any number of other
persons, shall conform our conduct to certain general instructions. So
far as this asserts a fact, namely, a volition of the legislator, that
fact is an individual fact, and the proposition, therefore, is not a
general proposition. But the description therein contained of the
conduct which it is the will of the legislator that his subjects should
observe, is general. The proposition asserts, not that all men _are_
anything, but that all men _shall_ do something.
In both these cases the generalities are the original data, and the
particulars are elicited from them by a process which correctly resolves
itself into a series of syllogisms. The real nature, however, of the
supposed deductive process, is evident enough. The only point to be
determined is, whether the authority which declared the general
proposition, intended to include this case in it; and whether the
legislator intended his command to apply to the present case among
others, or not. This is ascertained by examining whether the case
possesses the marks by which, as those authorities have signified, the
cases which they meant to certify or to influence may be known. The
object of the inquiry is to make out the witness's or the legislator's
intention, through the indication given by their words. This is a
question, as the Germans express it, of hermeneutics. The operation is
not a process of inference, but a process of interpretation.