A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I
John Stuart Mill · en
These considerations also remove the objection arising from the
impossibility of ocularly following the lines in their prolongation to
infinity. For though, in order actually to see that two given lines
never meet, it would be necessary to follow them to infinity; yet
without doing so we may know that if they ever do meet, or if, after
diverging from one another, they begin again to approach, this must take
place not at an infinite, but at a finite distance. Supposing,
therefore, such to be the case, we can transport ourselves thither in
imagination, and can frame a mental image of the appearance which one or
both of the lines must present at that point, which we may rely on as
being precisely similar to the reality. Now, whether we fix our
contemplation upon this imaginary picture, or call to mind the
generalizations we have had occasion to make from former ocular
observation, we learn by the evidence of experience, that a line which,
after diverging from another straight line, begins to approach to it,
produces the impression on our senses which we describe by the
expression, "a bent line," not by the expression, "a straight line."[23]
§ 6. The first of the two arguments in support of the theory that
axioms are _à priori_ truths, having, I think, been sufficiently
answered; I proceed to the second, which is usually the most relied on.
Axioms (it is asserted) are conceived by us not only as true, but as
universally and necessarily true. Now, experience cannot possibly give
to any proposition this character. I may have seen snow a hundred
times, and may have seen that it was white, but this cannot give me
entire assurance even that all snow is white; much less that snow _must_
be white. "However many instances we may have observed of the truth of a
proposition, there is nothing to assure us that the next case shall not
be an exception to the rule. If it be strictly true that every ruminant
animal yet known has cloven hoofs, we still cannot be sure that some
creature will not hereafter be discovered which has the first of these
attributes, without having the other.... Experience must always consist
of a limited number of observations; and, however numerous these may be,
they can show nothing with regard to the infinite number of cases in
which the experiment has not been made." Besides, Axioms are not only
universal, they are also necessary. Now "experience cannot offer the
smallest ground for the necessity of a proposition. She can observe and
record what has happened; but she cannot find, in any case, or in any
accumulation of cases, any reason for what _must_ happen. She may see
objects side by side; but she cannot see a reason why they must ever be
side by side. She finds certain events to occur in succession; but the
succession supplies, in its occurrence, no reason for its recurrence.
She contemplates external objects; but she cannot detect any internal
bond, which indissolubly connects the future with the past, the possible