A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I
John Stuart Mill · en
§ 4. Sir William Hamilton holds as I do, that inconceivability is no
criterion of impossibility. "There is no ground for inferring a certain
fact to be impossible, merely from our inability to conceive its
possibility." "Things there are which _may_, nay _must_, be true, of
which the understanding is wholly unable to construe to itself the
possibility."[43] Sir William Hamilton is however a firm believer in the
_à priori_ character of many axioms, and of the sciences deduced from
them; and is so far from considering those axioms to rest on the
evidence of experience, that he declares certain of them to be true even
of Noumena--of the Unconditioned--of which it is one of the principal
aims of his philosophy to prove that the nature of our faculties debars
us from having any knowledge. The axioms to which he attributes this
exceptional emancipation from the limits which confine all our other
possibilities of knowledge; the chinks through which, as he represents,
one ray of light finds its way to us from behind the curtain which veils
from us the mysterious world of Things in themselves,--are the two
principles, which he terms, after the schoolmen, the Principle of
Contradiction, and the Principle of Excluded Middle: the first, that two
contradictory propositions cannot both be true; the second, that they
cannot both be false. Armed with these logical weapons, we may boldly
face Things in themselves, and tender to them the double alternative,
sure that they must absolutely elect one or the other side, though we
may be for ever precluded from discovering which. To take his favourite
example, we cannot conceive the infinite divisibility of matter, and we
cannot conceive a minimum, or end to divisibility: yet one or the other
must be true.
As I have hitherto said nothing of the two axioms in question, those of
Contradiction and of Excluded Middle, it is not unseasonable to consider
them here. The former asserts that an affirmative proposition and the
corresponding negative proposition cannot both be true; which has
generally been held to be intuitively evident. Sir William Hamilton and
the Germans consider it to be the statement in words of a form or law of
our thinking faculty. Other philosophers, not less deserving of
consideration, deem it to be an identical proposition; an assertion
involved in the meaning of terms; a mode of defining Negation, and the
word Not.