A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I
John Stuart Mill · en
Dr. Whewell also says, that it does not appear why this resemblance of
ideas to the sensations of which they are copies, should be spoken of as
if it were a peculiarity of one class of ideas, those of space. My reply
is, that I do not so speak of it. The peculiarity I contend for is only
one of degree. All our ideas of sensation of course resemble the
corresponding sensations, but they do so with very different degrees of
exactness and of reliability. No one, I presume, can recal in
imagination a colour or an odour with the same distinctness and accuracy
with which almost every one can mentally reproduce an image of a
straight line or a triangle. To the extent, however, of their
capabilities of accuracy, our recollections of colours or of odours may
serve as subjects of experimentation, as well as those of lines and
spaces, and may yield conclusions which will be true of their external
prototypes. A person in whom, either from natural gift or from
cultivation, the impressions of colour were peculiarly vivid and
distinct, if asked which of two blue flowers was of the darkest tinge,
though he might never have compared the two, or even looked at them
together, might be able to give a confident answer on the faith of his
distinct recollection of the colours; that is, he might examine his
mental pictures, and find there a property of the outward objects. But
in hardly any case except that of simple geometrical forms, could this
be done by mankind generally, with a degree of assurance equal to that
which is given by a contemplation of the objects themselves. Persons
differ most widely in the precision of their recollection, even of
forms: one person, when he has looked any one in the face for half a
minute, can draw an accurate likeness of him from memory; another may
have seen him every day for six months, and hardly know whether his nose
is long or short. But everybody has a perfectly distinct mental image of
a straight line, a circle, or a rectangle. And every one concludes
confidently from these mental images to the corresponding outward
things. The truth is, that we may, and continually do, study nature in
our recollections, when the objects themselves are absent; and in the
case of geometrical forms we can perfectly, but in most other cases only
imperfectly, trust our recollections.
[24] _History of Scientific Ideas_, i. 65-67.
[25] Ibid. 60.
[26] _History of Scientific Ideas_, i. 58, 59.
[27] "If all mankind had spoken one language, we cannot doubt that there
would have been a powerful, perhaps a universal, school of philosophers,
who would have believed in the inherent connexion between names and
things, who would have taken the sound _man_ to be the mode of agitating
the air which is essentially communicative of the ideas of reason,
cookery, bipedality, &c."--De Morgan, _Formal Logic_, p. 246.