A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I
John Stuart Mill · en
On the other hand, if an induction conflicts with stronger inductions,
or with conclusions capable of being correctly deduced from them, then,
unless on reconsideration it should appear that some of the stronger
inductions have been expressed with greater universality than their
evidence warrants, the weaker one must give way. The opinion so long
prevalent that a comet, or any other unusual appearance in the heavenly
regions, was the precursor of calamities to mankind, or to those at
least who witnessed it; the belief in the veracity of the oracles
of Delphi or Dodona; the reliance on astrology, or on the
weather-prophecies in almanacs, were doubtless inductions supposed to be
grounded on experience:[13] and faith in such delusions seems quite
capable of holding out against a great multitude of failures, provided
it be nourished by a reasonable number of casual coincidences between
the prediction and the event. What has really put an end to these
insufficient inductions, is their inconsistency with the stronger
inductions subsequently obtained by scientific inquiry, respecting the
causes on which terrestrial events really depend; and where those
scientific truths have not yet penetrated, the same or similar delusions
still prevail.
It may be affirmed as a general principle, that all inductions, whether
strong or weak, which can be connected by ratiocination, are
confirmatory of one another; while any which lead deductively to
consequences that are incompatible, become mutually each other's test,
showing that one or other must be given up, or at least more guardedly
expressed. In the case of inductions which confirm each other, the one
which becomes a conclusion from ratiocination rises to at least the
level of certainty of the weakest of those from which it is deduced;
while in general all are more or less increased in certainty. Thus the
Torricellian experiment, though a mere case of three more general laws,
not only strengthened greatly the evidence on which those laws rested,
but converted one of them (the weight of the atmosphere) from a doubtful
generalization into a completely established doctrine.
If, then, a survey of the uniformities which have been ascertained to
exist in nature, should point out some which, as far as any human
purpose requires certainty, may be considered quite certain and quite
universal; then by means of these uniformities we may be able to raise
multitudes of other inductions to the same point in the scale. For if we
can show, with respect to any inductive inference, that either it must
be true, or one of these certain and universal inductions must admit of
an exception; the former generalization will attain the same certainty,
and indefeasibleness within the bounds assigned to it, which are the
attributes of the latter. It will be proved to be a law; and if not a
result of other and simpler laws, it will be a law of nature.