A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I
John Stuart Mill · en
A proposition, we have before said, is a portion of discourse in which a
predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject. A predicate and a subject
are all that is necessarily required to make up a proposition: but as we
cannot conclude from merely seeing two names put together, that they are
a predicate and a subject, that is, that one of them is intended to be
affirmed or denied of the other, it is necessary that there should be
some mode or form of indicating that such is the intention; some sign to
distinguish a predication from any other kind of discourse. This is
sometimes done by a slight alteration of one of the words, called an
_inflection_; as when we say, Fire burns; the change of the second word
from _burn_ to _burns_ showing that we mean to affirm the predicate burn
of the subject fire. But this function is more commonly fulfilled by the
word _is_, when an affirmation is intended, _is not_, when a negation;
or by some other part of the verb _to be_. The word which thus serves
the purpose of a sign of predication is called, as we formerly observed,
the _copula_. It is important that there should be no indistinctness in
our conception of the nature and office of the copula; for confused
notions respecting it are among the causes which have spread mysticism
over the field of logic, and perverted its speculations into
logomachies.
It is apt to be supposed that the copula is something more than a mere
sign of predication; that it also signifies existence. In the
proposition, Socrates is just, it may seem to be implied not only that
the quality _just_ can be affirmed of Socrates, but moreover that
Socrates _is_, that is to say, exists. This, however, only shows that
there is an ambiguity in the word _is_; a word which not only performs
the function of the copula in affirmations, but has also a meaning of
its own, in virtue of which it may itself be made the predicate of a
proposition. That the employment of it as a copula does not necessarily
include the affirmation of existence, appears from such a proposition as
this, A centaur is a fiction of the poets; where it cannot possibly be
implied that a centaur exists, since the proposition itself expressly
asserts that the thing has no real existence.