A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
To begin with the science of number. The elementary or ultimate truths
of this science are the common axioms concerning equality, namely,
"Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another," and
"Equals added to equals make equal sums," (no other axioms are
required,[38]) together with the definitions of the various numbers.
Like other so-called definitions, these are composed of two things, the
explanation of a name, and the assertion of a fact: of which the latter
alone can form a first principle or premise of a science. The fact
asserted in the definition of a number is a physical fact. Each of the
numbers two, three, four, &c., denotes physical phenomena, and connotes
a physical property of those phenomena. Two, for instance, denotes all
pairs of things, and twelve all dozens of things, connoting what makes
them pairs, or dozens; and that which makes them so is something
physical; since it cannot be denied that two apples are physically
distinguishable from three apples, two horses from one horse, and so
forth: that they are a different visible and tangible phenomenon. I am
not undertaking to say what the difference is; it is enough that there
is a difference of which the senses can take cognizance. And although a
hundred and two horses are not so easily distinguished from a hundred
and three, as two horses are from three--though in most positions the
senses do not perceive any difference--yet they may be so placed that a
difference will be perceptible, or else we should never have
distinguished them, and given them different names. Weight is
confessedly a physical property of things; yet small differences between
great weights are as imperceptible to the senses in most situations, as
small differences between great numbers; and are only put in evidence by
placing the two objects in a peculiar position--namely, in the opposite
scales of a delicate balance.
What, then, is that which is connoted by a name of number? Of course
some property belonging to the agglomeration of things which we call by
the name; and that property is, the characteristic manner in which the
agglomeration is made up of, and may be separated into, parts. I will
endeavour to make this more intelligible by a few explanations.