A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
It would be inconsistent with the scale of this work, and not necessary
to its design, to carry the analysis of the truths and processes of
algebra any farther; which is also the less needful, as the task has
been, to a very great extent, performed by other writers. Peacock's
Algebra, and Dr. Whewell's _Doctrine of Limits_, are full of instruction
on the subject. The profound treatises of a truly philosophical
mathematician, Professor De Morgan, should be studied by every one who
desires to comprehend the evidence of mathematical truths, and the
meaning of the obscurer processes of the calculus; and the speculations
of M. Comte, in his _Cours de Philosophie Positive_, on the philosophy
of the higher branches of mathematics, are among the many valuable gifts
for which philosophy is indebted to that eminent thinker.
§ 7. If the extreme generality, and remoteness not so much from sense as
from the visual and tactual imagination, of the laws of number, renders
it a somewhat difficult effort of abstraction to conceive those laws as
being in reality physical truths obtained by observation; the same
difficulty does not exist with regard to the laws of extension. The
facts of which those laws are expressions, are of a kind peculiarly
accessible to the senses, and suggesting eminently distinct images to
the fancy. That geometry is a strictly physical science would doubtless
have been recognised in all ages, had it not been for the illusions
produced by two circumstances. One of these is the characteristic
property, already noticed, of the facts of geometry, that they may be
collected from our ideas or mental pictures of objects as effectually as
from the objects themselves. The other is, the demonstrative character
of geometrical truths; which was at one time supposed to constitute a
radical distinction between them and physical truths, the latter, as
resting on merely probable evidence, being deemed essentially uncertain
and unprecise. The advance of knowledge has, however, made it manifest
that physical science, in its better understood branches, is quite as
demonstrative as geometry. The task of deducing its details from a few
comparatively simple principles is found to be anything but the
impossibility it was once supposed to be; and the notion of the superior
certainty of geometry is an illusion, arising from the ancient prejudice
which, in that science, mistakes the ideal data from which we reason,
for a peculiar class of realities, while the corresponding ideal data of
any deductive physical science are recognised as what they really are,
mere hypotheses.