A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
[21] The writer last quoted says that the valuation of chances by
comparing the number of cases in which the event occurs with the number
in which it does not occur, "would generally be wholly erroneous," and
"is not the true theory of probability." It is at least that which forms
the foundation of insurance, and of all those calculations of chances in
the business of life which experience so abundantly verifies. The reason
which the reviewer gives for rejecting the theory, is that it "would
regard an event as certain which had hitherto never failed; which is
exceedingly far from the truth, even for a very large number of constant
successes." This is not a defect in a particular theory, but in any
theory of chances. No principle of evaluation can provide for such a
case as that which the reviewer supposes. If an event has never once
failed, in a number of trials sufficient to eliminate chance, it really
has all the certainty which can be given by an empirical law: it _is_
certain during the continuance of the same collocation of causes which
existed during the observations. If it ever fails, it is in consequence
of some change in that collocation. Now, no theory of chances will
enable us to infer the future probability of an event from the past, if
the causes in operation, capable of influencing the event, have
intermediately undergone a change.
[22] Pp. 18, 19. The theorem is not stated by Laplace in the exact terms
in which I have stated it; but the identity of import of the two modes
of expression is easily demonstrable.
[23] For a fuller treatment of the many interesting questions raised by
the theory of probabilities, I may now refer to a recent work by Mr.
Venn, Fellow of Caius College, Cambridge, "The Logic of Chance;" one of
the most thoughtful and philosophical treatises on any subject connected
with Logic and Evidence, which have been produced in this or any other
country for many years. Some criticisms contained in it have been very
useful to me in revising the corresponding chapters of the present work.
In several of Mr. Venn's opinions, however, I do not agree. What these
are will be obvious to any reader of Mr. Venn's work who is also a
reader of this.