A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
But though general names are imposed by the vulgar without any more
definite connotation than that of a vague resemblance; general
propositions come in time to be made, in which predicates are applied to
those names, that is, general assertions are made concerning the _whole_
of the things which are denoted by the name. And since by each of these
propositions some attribute, more or less precisely conceived, is of
course predicated, the ideas of these various attributes thus become
associated with the name, and in a sort of uncertain way it comes to
connote them; there is a hesitation to apply the name in any new case in
which any of the attributes familiarly predicated of the class do not
exist. And thus, to common minds, the propositions which they are in the
habit of hearing or uttering concerning a class, make up in a loose way
a sort of connotation for the class-name. Let us take, for instance, the
word Civilized. How few could be found, even among the most educated
persons, who would undertake to say exactly what the term Civilized
connotes. Yet there is a feeling in the minds of all who use it, that
they are using it with a meaning; and this meaning is made up, in a
confused manner, of everything which they have heard or read that
civilized men, or civilized communities, are, or may be expected to be.
It is at this stage, probably, in the progress of a concrete name, that
the corresponding abstract name generally comes into use. Under the
notion that the concrete name must of course convey a meaning, or in
other words, that there is some property common to all things which it
denotes, people give a name to this common property; from the concrete
Civilized, they form the abstract Civilization. But since most people
have never compared the different things which are called by the
concrete name, in such a manner as to ascertain what properties these
things have in common, or whether they have any; each is thrown back
upon the marks by which he himself has been accustomed to be guided in
his application of the term: and these, being merely vague hearsays and
current phrases, are not the same in any two persons, nor in the same
person at different times. Hence the word (as Civilization, for example)
which professes to be the designation of the unknown common property,
conveys scarcely to any two minds the same idea. No two persons agree in
the things they predicate of it; and when it is itself predicated of
anything, no other person knows, nor does the speaker himself know with
precision, what he means to assert. Many other words which could be
named, as the word _honour_, or the word _gentleman_, exemplify this
uncertainty still more strikingly.