A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
An example may make these remarks more intelligible. In all ages, except
where moral speculation has been silenced by outward compulsion, or
where the feelings which prompt to it still continue to be satisfied by
the traditional doctrines of an established faith, one of the subjects
which have most occupied the minds of thinking persons is the inquiry,
What is virtue? or, What is a virtuous character? Among the different
theories on the subject which have, at different times, grown up and
obtained partial currency, every one of which reflected as in the
clearest mirror, the express image of the age which gave it birth; there
was one, according to which virtue consists in a correct calculation of
our own personal interests, either in this world only, or also in
another. To make this theory plausible, it was of course necessary that
the only beneficial actions which people in general were accustomed to
see, or were therefore accustomed to praise, should be such as were, or
at least might without contradicting obvious facts be supposed to be,
the result of a prudential regard to self-interest; so that the words
really connoted no more, in common acceptation, than was set down in the
definition.
Suppose, now, that the partisans of this theory had contrived to
introduce a consistent and undeviating use of the term according to this
definition. Suppose that they had seriously endeavoured, and had
succeeded in the endeavour, to banish the word disinterestedness from
the language; had obtained the disuse of all expressions attaching odium
to selfishness or commendation to self-sacrifice, or which implied
generosity or kindness to be anything but doing a benefit in order to
receive a greater personal advantage in return. Need we say, that this
abrogation of the old formulas for the sake of preserving clear ideas
and consistency of thought, would have been a great evil? while the very
inconsistency incurred by the coexistence of the formulas with
philosophical opinions which seemed to condemn them as absurdities,
operated as a stimulus to the re-examination of the subject; and thus
the very doctrines originating in the oblivion into which a part of the
truth had fallen, were rendered indirectly, but powerfully, instrumental
to its revival.