A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
§ 1. It is not only in the mode which has now been pointed out, namely
by gradual inattention to a portion of the ideas conveyed, that words in
common use are liable to shift their connotation. The truth is, that the
connotation of such words is perpetually varying; as might be expected
from the manner in which words in common use acquire their connotation.
A technical term, invented for purposes of art or science, has, from the
first, the connotation given to it by its inventor; but a name which is
in every one's mouth before any one thinks of defining it, derives its
connotation only from the circumstances which are habitually brought to
mind when it is pronounced. Among these circumstances, the properties
common to the things denoted by the name, have naturally a principal
place; and would have the sole place, if language were regulated by
convention rather than by custom and accident. But besides these common
properties, which if they exist are _certainly_ present whenever the
name is employed, any other circumstance may _casually_ be found along
with it, so frequently as to become associated with it in the same
manner, and as strongly, as the common properties themselves. In
proportion as this association forms itself, people give up using the
name in cases in which those casual circumstances do not exist. They
prefer using some other name, or the same name with some adjunct, rather
than employ an expression which will call up an idea they do not want to
excite. The circumstance originally casual, thus becomes regularly a
part of the connotation of the word.