A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
"Though in a Natural group of objects a definition can no longer be of
any use as a regulative principle, classes are not therefore left quite
loose, without any certain standard or guide. The class is steadily
fixed, though not precisely limited; it is given, though not
circumscribed; it is determined, not by a boundary line without, but by
a central point within; not by what it strictly excludes, but by what it
eminently includes; by an example, not by a precept; in short, instead
of a Definition we have a Type for our director.
"A Type is an example of any class, for instance a species of a genus,
which is considered as eminently possessing the character of the class.
All the species which have a greater affinity with this type-species
than with any others, form the genus, and are arranged about it,
deviating from it in various directions and different degrees. Thus a
genus may consist of several species which approach very near the type,
and of which the claim to a place with it is obvious; while there may be
other species which straggle further from this central knot, and which
yet are clearly more connected with it than with any other. And even if
there should be some species of which the place is dubious, and which
appear to be equally bound to two generic types, it is easily seen that
this would not destroy the reality of the generic groups, any more than
the scattered trees of the intervening plain prevent our speaking
intelligibly of the distinct forests of two separate hills.
"The type-species of every genus, the type-genus of every family, is,
then, one which possesses all the characters and properties of the genus
in a marked and prominent manner. The type of the Rose family has
alternate stipulate leaves, wants the albumen, has the ovules not erect,
has the stigmata simple, and besides these features, which distinguish
it from the exceptions or varieties of its class, it has the features
which make it prominent in its class. It is one of those which possess
clearly several leading attributes; and thus, though we cannot say of
any one genus that it _must_ be the type of the family, or of any one
species that it _must_ be the type of the genus, we are still not wholly
to seek; the type must be connected by many affinities with most of the
others of its group; it must be near the centre of the crowd, and not
one of the stragglers."
In this passage (the latter part of which especially I cannot help
noticing as an admirable example of philosophic style) Dr. Whewell has
stated very clearly and forcibly, but (I think) without making all
necessary distinctions, one of the principles of a Natural
Classification. What this principle is, what are its limits, and in what
manner he seems to me to have overstepped them, will appear when we have
laid down another rule of Natural Arrangement, which appears to me still
more fundamental.