A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
We shall see presently that where the classification is made for the
express purpose of a special inductive inquiry, it is not optional, but
necessary for fulfilling the conditions of a correct Inductive Method,
that we should establish a type-species or genus, namely, the one which
exhibits in the most eminent degree the particular phenomenon under
investigation. But of this hereafter. It remains, for completing the
theory of natural groups, that a few words should be said on the
principles of the nomenclature adapted to them.
§ 5. A Nomenclature in science, is, as we have said, a system of the
names of Kinds. These names, like other class-names, are defined by the
enumeration of the characters distinctive of the class. The only merit
which a set of names can have beyond this, is to convey, by the mode of
their construction, as much information as possible: so that a person
who knows the thing, may receive all the assistance which the name can
give in remembering what he knows, while he who knows it not, may
receive as much knowledge respecting it as the case admits of, by merely
being told its name.
There are two modes of giving to the name of a Kind this sort of
significance. The best, but which unfortunately is seldom practicable,
is when the word can be made to indicate, by its formation, the very
properties which it is designed to connote. The name of a Kind does not,
of course, connote all the properties of the Kind, since these are
inexhaustible, but such of them as are sufficient to distinguish it;
such as are sure marks of all the rest. Now, it is very rarely that one
property, or even any two or three properties, can answer this purpose.
To distinguish the common daisy from all other species of plants would
require the specification of many characters. And a name cannot, without
being too cumbrous for use, give indication, by its etymology or mode of
construction, of more than a very small number of these. The
possibility, therefore, of an ideally perfect Nomenclature, is probably
confined to the one case in which we are happily in possession of
something nearly approaching to it; the Nomenclature of elementary
Chemistry. The substances, whether simple or compound, with which
chemistry is conversant, are Kinds, and, as such, the properties which
distinguish each of them from the rest are innumerable; but in the case
of compound substances (the simple ones are not numerous enough to
require a systematic nomenclature), there is one property, the chemical
composition, which is of itself sufficient to distinguish the Kind; and
is (with certain reservations not yet thoroughly understood) a sure mark
of all the other properties of the compound. All that was needful,
therefore, was to make the name of every compound express, on the first
hearing, its chemical composition; that is, to form the name of the
compound, in some uniform manner, from the names of the simple
substances which enter into it as elements. This was done, most