A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
To descend to more modern instances; it was long thought, and was
stoutly maintained by the Cartesians and even by Leibnitz against the
Newtonian system, (nor did Newton himself, as we have seen, contest the
assumption, but eluded it by an arbitrary hypothesis), that nothing (of
a physical nature at least) could account for motion, except previous
motion; the impulse or impact of some other body. It was very long
before the scientific world could prevail upon itself to admit
attraction and repulsion (_i. e._ spontaneous tendencies of particles to
approach or recede from one another) as ultimate laws, no more requiring
to be accounted for than impulse itself, if indeed the latter were not,
in truth, resolvable into the former. From the same source arose the
innumerable hypotheses devised to explain those classes of motions which
appeared more mysterious than others because there was no obvious mode
of attributing them to impulse, as for example the voluntary motions of
the human body. Such were the interminable systems of vibrations
propagated along the nerves, or animal spirits rushing up and down
between the muscles and the brain; which, if the facts could have been
proved, would have been an important addition to our knowledge of
physiological laws; but the mere invention, or arbitrary supposition of
them, could not unless by the strongest delusion be supposed to render
the phenomena of animal life more comprehensible, or less mysterious.
Nothing, however, seemed satisfactory, but to make out that motion was
caused by motion; by something like itself. If it was not one kind of
motion, it must be another. In like manner it was supposed that the
physical qualities of objects must arise from some similar quality, or
perhaps only some quality bearing the same name, in the particles or
atoms of which the objects were composed; that a sharp taste, for
example, must arise from sharp particles. And reversing the inference,
the effects produced by a phenomenon must, it was supposed, resemble in
their physical attributes the phenomenon itself. The influences of the
planets were supposed to be analogous to their visible peculiarities:
Mars, being of a red colour, portended fire and slaughter; and the like.