A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
The considerations which, as I apprehend, give, at the present day, to
the proof of the law of uniformity of succession as true of all
phenomena without exception, this character of completeness and
conclusiveness, are the following:--First, that we now know it directly
to be true of far the greatest number of phenomena; that there are none
of which we know it not to be true, the utmost that can be said being,
that of some we cannot positively from direct evidence affirm its truth;
while phenomenon after phenomenon, as they become better known to us,
are constantly passing from the latter class into the former; and in all
cases in which that transition has not yet taken place, the absence of
direct proof is accounted for by the rarity or the obscurity of the
phenomena, our deficient means of observing them, or the logical
difficulties arising from the complication of the circumstances in which
they occur; insomuch that, notwithstanding as rigid a dependence on
given conditions as exists in the case of any other phenomenon, it was
not likely that we should be better acquainted with those conditions
than we are. Besides this first class of considerations, there is a
second, which still further corroborates the conclusion. Although there
are phenomena the production and changes of which elude all our attempts
to reduce them universally to any ascertained law; yet in every such
case, the phenomenon, or the objects concerned in it, are found in some
instances to obey the known laws of nature. The wind, for example, is
the type of uncertainty and caprice, yet we find it in some cases
obeying with as much constancy as any phenomenon in nature the law of
the tendency of fluids to distribute themselves so as to equalize the
pressure on every side of each of their particles; as in the case of the
trade winds, and the monsoons. Lightning might once have been supposed
to obey no laws; but since it has been ascertained to be identical with
electricity, we know that the very same phenomenon in some of its
manifestations is implicitly obedient to the action of fixed causes. I
do not believe that there is now one object or event in all our
experience of nature, within the bounds of the solar system at least,
which has not either been ascertained by direct observation to follow
laws of its own, or been proved to be closely similar to objects and
events which, in more familiar manifestations, or on a more limited
scale, follow strict laws: our inability to trace the same laws on a
larger scale and in the more recondite instances, being accounted for by
the number and complication of the modifying causes, or by their
inaccessibility to observation.