A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2)
John Stuart Mill · en
These considerations also remove the objection arising from the
impossibility of ocularly following the lines in their prolongation to
infinity, for though, in order actually to see that two given lines never
meet, it would be necessary to follow them to infinity; yet without doing
so we may know that if they ever do meet, or if, after diverging from one
another, they begin again to approach, this must take place not at an
infinite, but at a finite distance. Supposing, therefore, such to be the
case, we can transport ourselves thither in imagination, and can frame a
mental image of the appearance which one or both of the lines must present
at that point, which we may rely on as being precisely similar to the
reality. Now, whether we fix our contemplation upon this imaginary
picture, or call to mind the generalizations we have had occasion to make
from former ocular observation, we learn by the evidence of experience,
that a line which, after diverging from another straight line, begins to
approach to it, produces the impression on our senses which we describe by
the expression, “a bent line,” not by the expression, “a straight
line.”(40)
§ 6. The first of the two arguments in support of the theory that axioms
are _à priori_ truths, having, I think, been sufficiently answered; I
proceed to the second, which is usually the most relied on. Axioms (it is
asserted) are conceived by us not only as true, but as universally and
necessarily true. Now, experience cannot possibly give to any proposition
this character. I may have seen snow a hundred times, and may have seen
that it was white, but this cannot give me entire assurance even that all
snow is white; much less that snow _must_ be white. “However many
instances we may have observed of the truth of a proposition, there is
nothing to assure us that the next case shall not be an exception to the
rule. If it be strictly true that every ruminant animal yet known has
cloven hoofs, we still cannot be sure that some creature will not
hereafter be discovered which has the first of these attributes, without
having the other.... Experience must always consist of a limited number of
observations; and, however numerous these may be, they can show nothing
with regard to the infinite number of cases in which the experiment has
not been made.” Besides, axioms are not only universal, they are also
necessary. Now “experience cannot offer the smallest ground for the
necessity of a proposition. She can observe and record what has happened;
but she cannot find, in any case, or in any accumulation of cases, any
reason for what _must_ happen. She may see objects side by side; but she
cannot see a reason why they must ever be side by side. She finds certain
events to occur in succession; but the succession supplies, in its
occurrence, no reason for its recurrence. She contemplates external
objects; but she cannot detect any internal bond, which indissolubly