A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2) — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2)
John Stuart Mill · en
That a philosopher of Dr. Whewell’s eminence should gravely assert that we
cannot conceive a world in which the simple elements would combine in
other than definite proportions; that by dint of meditating on a
scientific truth, the original discoverer of which was still living, he
should have rendered the association in his own mind between the idea of
combination and that of constant proportions so familiar and intimate as
to be unable to conceive the one fact without the other; is so signal an
instance of the mental law for which I am contending, that one word more
in illustration must be superfluous.(52)
CHAPTER VI. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.
§ 1. In the examination which formed the subject of the last chapter, into
the nature of the evidence of those deductive sciences which are commonly
represented to be systems of necessary truth, we have been led to the
following conclusions. The results of those sciences are indeed necessary,
in the sense of necessarily following from certain first principles,
commonly called axioms and definitions; of being certainly true if those
axioms and definitions are so. But their claim to the character of
necessity in any sense beyond this, as implying an evidence independent of
and superior to observation and experience, must depend on the previous
establishment of such a claim in favour of the definitions and axioms
themselves. With regard to axioms, we found that, considered as
experimental truths, they rest on superabundant and obvious evidence. We
inquired, whether, since this is the case, it be necessary to suppose any
other evidence of those truths than experimental evidence, any other
origin for our belief of them than an experimental origin. We decided,
that the burden of proof lies with those who maintain the affirmative, and
we examined, at considerable length, such arguments as they have produced.
The examination having led to the rejection of those arguments, we have
thought ourselves warranted in concluding that axioms are but a class, the
highest class, of inductions from experience; the simplest and easiest
cases of generalization from the facts furnished to us by our senses or by
our internal consciousness.