A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2)
John Stuart Mill · en
§ 2. A second process which requires to be distinguished from Induction,
is one to which mathematicians sometimes give that name: and which so far
resembles Induction properly so called, that the propositions it leads to
are really general propositions. For example, when we have proved with
respect to the circle, that a straight line cannot meet it in more than
two points, and when the same thing has been successively proved of the
ellipse, the parabola, and the hyperbola, it may be laid down as an
universal property of the sections of the cone. In this example there is
no induction, because there is no inference: the conclusion is a mere
summing up of what was asserted in the various propositions from which it
is drawn. A case somewhat, though not altogether, similar, is the proof of
a geometrical theorem by means of a diagram. Whether the diagram be on
paper or only in the imagination, the demonstration (as formerly
observed(54)) does not prove directly the general theorem; it proves only
that the conclusion, which the theorem asserts generally, is true of the
particular triangle or circle exhibited in the diagram; but since we
perceive that in the same way in which we have proved it of that circle,
it might also be proved of any other circle, we gather up into one general
expression all the singular propositions susceptible of being thus proved,
and embody them in an universal proposition. Having shown that the three
angles of the triangle ABC are together equal to two right angles, we
conclude that this is true of every other triangle, not because it is true
of ABC, but for the same reason which proved it to be true of ABC. If this
were to be called Induction, an appropriate name for it would be,
induction by parity of reasoning. But the term cannot properly belong to
it; the characteristic quality of Induction is wanting, since the truth
obtained, though really general, is not believed on the evidence of
particular instances. We do not conclude that all triangles have the
property because some triangles have, but from the ulterior demonstrative
evidence which was the ground of our conviction in the particular
instances.