A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2) — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2)
John Stuart Mill · en
Complex uniformities which, like this, are mere cases of simpler ones, and
have, therefore, been virtually affirmed in affirming those, may with
propriety be called _laws_, but can scarcely, in the strictness of
scientific speech, be termed Laws of Nature. It is the custom in science,
wherever regularity of any kind can be traced, to call the general
proposition which expresses the nature of that regularity, a _law_; as
when, in mathematics, we speak of the law of decrease of the successive
terms of a converging series. But the expression, _law of nature_, has
generally been employed with a sort of tacit reference to the original
sense of the word _law_, namely, the expression of the will of a superior.
When, therefore, it appeared that any of the uniformities which were
observed in nature, would result spontaneously from certain other
uniformities, no separate act of creative will being supposed necessary
for the production of the derivative uniformities, these have not usually
been spoken of as laws of nature. According to another mode of expression,
the question, What are the laws of nature? may be stated thus:—What are
the fewest and simplest assumptions, which being granted, the whole
existing order of nature would result? Another mode of stating it would be
thus: What are the fewest general propositions from which all the
uniformities which exist in the universe might be deductively inferred?
Every great advance which marks an epoch in the progress of science, has
consisted in a step made towards the solution of this problem. Even a
simple colligation of inductions already made, without any fresh extension
of the inductive inference, is already an advance in that direction. When
Kepler expressed the regularity which exists in the observed motions of
the heavenly bodies, by the three general propositions called his laws,
he, in so doing, pointed out three simple suppositions which, instead of a
much greater number, would suffice to construct the whole scheme of the
heavenly motions, so far as it was known up to that time. A similar and
still greater step was made when these laws, which at first did not seem
to be included in any more general truths, were discovered to be cases of
the three laws of motion, as obtaining among bodies which mutually tend
towards one another with a certain force, and have had a certain
instantaneous impulse originally impressed upon them. After this great
discovery, Kepler’s three propositions, though still called laws, would
hardly, by any person accustomed to use language with precision, be termed
laws of nature: that phrase would be reserved for the simpler laws into
which Newton is said to have resolved them.