A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2)
John Stuart Mill · en
§ 4. Among the positive conditions, as we have seen that there are some to
which, in common parlance, the term cause is more readily and frequently
awarded, so there are others to which it is, in ordinary circumstances,
refused. In most cases of causation a distinction is commonly drawn
between something which acts, and some other thing which is acted upon;
between an _agent_ and a _patient_. Both of these, it would be universally
allowed, are conditions of the phenomenon; but it would be thought absurd
to call the latter the cause, that title being reserved for the former.
The distinction, however, vanishes on examination, or rather is found to
be only verbal; arising from an incident of mere expression, namely, that
the object said to be _acted upon_, and which is considered as the scene
in which the effect takes place, is commonly included in the phrase by
which the effect is spoken of, so that if it were also reckoned as part of
the cause, the seeming incongruity would arise of its being supposed to
cause itself. In the instance which we have already had, of falling
bodies, the question was thus put:—What is the cause which makes a stone
fall? and if the answer had been “the stone itself,” the expression would
have been in apparent contradiction to the meaning of the word cause. The
stone, therefore, is conceived as the patient, and the earth (or,
according to the common and most unphilosophical practice, some occult
quality of the earth) is represented as the agent, or cause. But that
there is nothing fundamental in the distinction may be seen from this,
that it is quite possible to conceive the stone as causing its own fall,
provided the language employed be such as to save the mere verbal
incongruity. We might say that the stone moves towards the earth by the
properties of the matter composing it; and according to this mode of
presenting the phenomenon, the stone itself might without impropriety be
called the agent; although, to save the established doctrine of the
inactivity of matter, men usually prefer here also to ascribe the effect
to an occult quality, and say that the cause is not the stone itself, but
the _weight_ or _gravitation_ of the stone.