A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2) — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2)
John Stuart Mill · en
This class of considerations leads to a conception which we shall find to
be of great importance, that of a Permanent Cause, or original natural
agent. There exist in nature a number of permanent causes, which have
subsisted ever since the human race has been in existence, and for an
indefinite and probably an enormous length of time previous. The sun, the
earth, and planets, with their various constituents, air, water, and the
other distinguishable substances, whether simple or compound, of which
nature is made up, are such Permanent Causes. These have existed, and the
effects or consequences which they were fitted to produce have taken
place, (as often as the other conditions of the production met,) from the
very beginning of our experience. But we can give no account of the origin
of the Permanent Causes themselves. Why these particular natural agents
existed originally and no others, or why they are commingled in such and
such proportions, and distributed in such and such a manner throughout
space, is a question we cannot answer. More than this: we can discover
nothing regular in the distribution itself; we can reduce it to no
uniformity, to no law. There are no means by which, from the distribution
of these causes or agents in one part of space, we could conjecture
whether a similar distribution prevails in another. The coexistence,
therefore, of Primeval Causes, ranks, to us, among merely casual
concurrences: and all those sequences or coexistences among the effects of
several such causes, which, though invariable while those causes coexist,
would, if the coexistence terminated, terminate along with it, we do not
class as cases of causation, or laws of nature: we can only calculate on
finding these sequences or coexistences where we know by direct evidence,
that the natural agents on the properties of which they ultimately depend,
are distributed in the requisite manner. These Permanent Causes are not
always objects; they are sometimes events, that is to say, periodical
cycles of events, that being the only mode in which events can possess the
property of permanence. Not only, for instance, is the earth itself a
permanent cause, or primitive natural agent, but the earth’s rotation is
so too: it is a cause which has produced, from the earliest period, (by
the aid of other necessary conditions,) the succession of day and night,
the ebb and flow of the sea, and many other effects, while, as we can
assign no cause (except conjecturally) for the rotation itself, it is
entitled to be ranked as a primeval cause. It is, however, only the
_origin_ of the rotation which is mysterious to us: once begun, its
continuance is accounted for by the first law of motion (that of the
permanence of rectilinear motion once impressed) combined with the
gravitation of the parts of the earth towards one another.