A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2)
John Stuart Mill · en
any resemblance to those of any other phenomenon, whether of inorganic or
of organic nature.(74)
CHAPTER VI. OF THE COMPOSITION OF CAUSES.
§ 1. To complete the general notion of causation on which the rules of
experimental inquiry into the laws of nature must be founded, one
distinction still remains to be pointed out: a distinction so radical, and
of so much importance, as to require a chapter to itself.
The preceding discussions have rendered us familiar with the case in which
several agents, or causes, concur as conditions to the production of an
effect; a case, in truth, almost universal, there being very few effects
to the production of which no more than one agent contributes. Suppose,
then, that two different agents, operating jointly, are followed, under a
certain set of collateral conditions, by a given effect. If either of
these agents, instead of being joined with the other, had operated alone,
under the same set of conditions in all other respects, some effect would
probably have followed; which would have been different from the joint
effect of the two, and more or less dissimilar to it. Now, if we happen to
know what would be the effects of each cause when acting separately from
the other, we are often able to arrive deductively, or _à priori_, at a
correct prediction of what will arise from their conjunct agency. To
enable us to do this, it is only necessary that the same law which
expresses the effect of each cause acting by itself, shall also correctly
express the part due to that cause, of the effect which follows from the
two together. This condition is realised in the extensive and important
class of phenomena commonly called mechanical, namely the phenomena of the
communication of motion (or of pressure, which is tendency to motion) from
one body to another. In this important class of cases of causation, one
cause never, properly speaking, defeats or frustrates another; both have
their full effect. If a body is propelled in two directions by two forces,
one tending to drive it to the north, and the other to the east, it is
caused to move in a given time exactly as far in _both_ directions as the
two forces would separately have carried it; and is left precisely where
it would have arrived if it had been acted upon first by one of the two
forces, and afterwards by the other. This law of nature is called, in
dynamics, the principle of the Composition of Forces: and in imitation of
that well-chosen expression, I shall give the name of the Composition of
Causes to the principle which is exemplified in all cases in which the
joint effect of several causes is identical with the sum of their separate
effects.