The mental process which Logic deals with, viz. the investigation of truth by means of evidence, is always a process of Induction. Since Induction is simply the extension to a class of something observed to be true of certain members of it, Observation is the first preliminary to it. It is, therefore, right to consider, not indeed how or what to observe (for this belongs to the art of Education), but under what conditions observation is to be relied on. The sole condition is, that the supposed observation should really be an observation, and not an inference, whereas it is usually a compound of both, there being, in our propositions, besides observation which relates only to the sensations, an inference from the sensations to the objects themselves. Thus so-called errors of sense are only erroneous inferences from sense. The sensations themselves must be genuine; but, as they generally arise on a certain arrangement of outward objects being present to the organs, we, as though by instinct, infer this arrangement even when not existing. The sole object, then, of the logic of observation, is to separate the inferences from observation from the observations themselves, the only thing really observed by the mind (to waive the metaphysical problem as to the _perception_ of objects) being its own feelings or states of consciousness, outward, viz. Sensations, and inward, viz. Thoughts, Emotions, and Volitions. As in the simplest observation much is inference, so, in describing an observed fact, we not merely describe the fact, but are always forced to class it, affirming the resemblance, in regard of whatever is the ground of the name being given, between it and all other things denoted by the name. The resemblance is sometimes perceived by direct comparison of the objects together; sometimes (as, e.g. in the description of the earth's figure as globular and so forth) it is inferred through intermediate marks, i.e. deductively. When a hypothesis is made (e.g. by Kepler, as to the figure of the earth's orbit), and then verified by comparison with actual observations, Dr. Whewell calls the process Colligation of Facts by appropriate Conceptions, and affirms it to be the whole of Induction. But this also is only description, being really the ordinary process of ascertaining resemblance by a comparison of phenomena; and, though subsidiary to Induction, it is not itself Induction at all. CHAPTER II. ABSTRACTION, OR THE FORMATION OF CONCEPTIONS. _This Chapter is a digression._