1. Thus, where there is an ambiguous middle, or a term used in different senses in the premisses and in the conclusion, the argument proceeds as though there were evidence to the point, when, in fact, there is none. This error does not occur much in direct inductions, since the things themselves are there present to the senses or memory; but chiefly, in Ratiocination, where we are deciphering our own or others' notes. The ambiguity arises very often from assuming that a word corresponds precisely in meaning with the root itself (e.g. _representative_), or with cognate words from the same root, called _paronymous_ words (as, _artful_, with _art_). Other examples of ambiguities are; 'Money,' which, meaning both the currency and also capital seeking investment, is often thought to be scarce in the former sense, because scarce in the latter; 'Influence of Property,' which, signifying equally the influence of respect for the power for good, and of fear of the power for evil, which is possessed by the rich, is represented as being assailed under its former form when attacked really only under the latter; 'Theory,' which, because applied popularly to the accounting for an effect apart from facts, is ridiculed, even when expressing, as it properly does, the result of philosophical induction from experience; 'The Church,' which refers (as in the question of the inviolability of _Church_ property) sometimes to the clergy alone, sometimes to all its members; 'Good,' in the Stoic argument that virtue, as alone _good_ (in the Stoic sense), must therefore include freedom and beauty, because these are _good_ (in the popular sense). So, the meaning of 'I' shifts from _the laws of my nature_ to _my will_, in Descartes' _à priori_ argument for the being of a God, viz. that there must be an external archetype whence I got the conception, for if _I_ (i.e. _the laws of my nature_) made it, _I_ (i.e. _my will_, and not, as it should consistently be, _the laws of my nature_) could unmake it; but _I_ (i.e. _my will_) cannot. In the Free-Will controversy, 'I' is used ambiguously for volitions, actions, and mental dispositions, and 'Necessity' both for _Certainty_ and for _Compulsion_. From the application of 'same,' 'one,' 'identical,' which primarily refer to a single object, to several objects because _similar_, grew up (for the purpose of accounting for the supposed _oneness_ in things said to have the _same_ nature or qualities) both the Platonic _Ideas_, and also the _Substantial Forms_ and _Second Substances_ of the Aristotelians, even though the latter did see the distinction between things differing both _specie_ and _numero_, and those differing _numero_ only. And thence, too, sprang Berkeley's proof of the existence of a Universal Mind from the supposed need of such a Being to harbour, in the interval, the idea, which, one and the same (really, only two _similar_ ideas), a man's mind has entertained at two distinct times.