The theory of _free will_, viz. that the will is determined by itself, and not by antecedents, was invented as being more in accordance with the dignity of human nature and our consciousness of freedom, than _philosophical necessity_. The latter doctrine, in laying down simply that our volitions and actions are invariable consequents of our antecedent states of mind, and that, given our motives, character, and disposition, other men could predict our conduct as certainly as any physical event, states indeed nothing which is in itself either contradicted by our consciousness, or degrading; yet the doctrine of causation, as applied to volition, is supposed, from the natural tendency of the mind to imagine falsely that a mysterious constraint is exercised by _any_ antecedent over the consequent, to imply some state of dependence which our consciousness does contradict. Moreover, the erroneous notion that something more than uniformity of order and capability of being predicted is meant, has been favoured by the use of the ambiguous term _necessity_ (which, it is true, commonly implies irresistibleness), to signify simply that the given cause will be followed by the effect subject to all possibilities of counteraction by other causes. Most necessarians have been themselves deceived by the expression: they are apt to be partially fatalists as to their own actions, with a weaker spirit of self-culture than the believers in free-will, and to fail to see that the fact of their character being formed _for_ them, that is, by their circumstances, including their own organisation, is consistent with its being formed _by_ themselves, as intermediate agents, moulding it in any particular way which they may _wish_. The belief that the _wishing_ is excited by external causes, e.g. by education, casual aspirations, and experience of ills resulting from our previous character, can be of no practical harm, and does not conflict with our feeling of moral freedom, that is, of power, _if we wish_, to modify or conquer our own character. The ambiguity of the word _motive_ has also caused confusion. A motive, when used to signify that which determines the will, means not always or only the anticipation of a pleasure or a pain, but often the desire of the action itself. The action having finally become by association in itself desirable, we may get the habit of willing it (that is, get a _purpose_) without reference to its being pleasurable. We are then said to have a confirmed character. CHAPTER III. THERE IS, OR MAY BE, A SCIENCE OF HUMAN NATURE.