Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind
John Stuart Mill · en
object, we intend to assert that the object affects us in a manner
similar to that in which we are affected by a known class of
objects. A quality, indeed, in the custom of language, does not
admit of individuality: it is supposed to be one thing common to
many; which, being explained, means that it is the name of a
resemblance among our sensations, and not a name of the individual
sensations which resemble. Qualities, therefore, cannot be
predicated without general names; nor, consequently, without
classification. Wherever there is a general name there is a class:
classification, and general names, are things exactly coextensive.
It thus appears that, without classification, language would not
fulfil its most important function. Had we no names but those of
individuals, the names might serve as marks to bring those
individuals to mind, but would not enable us to make a single
assertion respecting them, except that one individual is not
another. Not a particle of the knowledge we have of them could be
expressed in words.--_Ed._]
{261} It was impossible that this process should not be involved in
obscurity, and liable to great {262} misapprehension, so long as the
manner, in which words become significant, was unexplained. After
this knowledge was imparted, and pretty generally diffused, the
value of it seemed for a long time to be little understood.
Words become significant purely by association. A word is pronounced
in conjunction with an idea; it is pronounced again and again; and,
by degrees, the idea and the word become so associated, that the one
can never occur without the other. To take first the example of an
individual object. The word, St. Paul's, has been so often named in
conjunction with the idea of a particular building, that the word,
St. Paul's, never occurs without calling up the idea of the
building, nor the idea of the building without calling up the name,
St. Paul's. The effect of association is similarly exemplified in
connecting the visible mark with the audible. Children learn first
to speak. They learn next to read. In learning to speak, they
associate the audible mark with their sensations and ideas; the
sound tree is associated with the sight of the tree, or the idea of
the tree. In learning to read, a new association has to be formed.
The _written word_ is a _visible_ sign of the _audible_ sign. What
reading accomplishes, by degrees, is, to associate the visible sign
so closely with the audible, that at the same instant with the sight
of the word the sound of it, and with the sound of it the sense,
occurs.
After the explanations which have been already {263} given, no
difficulty can remain about the manner in which names come to
signify the _individuals_ of which they are appointed to be the
marks.