Little more is necessary to explain this case of Belief in the truth of Propositions. Propositions are formed, either of general names, or particular names, that is, names of individuals. Propositions consisting of general names are by far the most numerous class, and by far the most important. The preceding exposition embraces them all. They are all merely verbal; and the Belief is nothing more than recognition of the coincidence, entire or partial, of two general names. The case of Propositions formed of particular names, is different, and yet remains to be explained. "Mr. Brougham made a speech in the House of Commons on such a day." The Predicate, "making a speech in the House of Commons," is neither general, so as to include the subject, "Mr. Brougham," as in a species; nor is the cluster of ideas, marked by the predicate, included in the cluster marked by the subject, as a part in its whole. The proposition marks a case either of experience, or of testimony. If I heard the speech, the proposition is an expression of the Memory of an event; Mr. Brougham, antecedent, and making a speech, consequent; and the Belief of the Proposition, is another name for the Memory of the Event. If I did not hear it, Belief of the proposition, is belief in the testimony of those who say they heard it. {393} As all propositions relating to individual objects are, after this manner, marks either of other men's testimony, or of our own experience, what belief, in these cases, is, has already been explained. Propositions relating to individuals may be expressions either of past, or of future events. Belief in past events, upon our own experience, is memory; upon other men's experience, is Belief in testimony; both of them resolved into association. Belief in future events, is the inseparable association of like consequents with like antecedents. It is not deemed necessary to unfold these associations. It has been already done. It seems enough, if they are indicated here.[107] [108] [Bain's footnote 107: The author has treated in different places several questions intimately allied. These are:-- 1. The essential nature of the state of mind called Belief, the mental region whence it springs, or the phenomena that it is to be classed with--whether Intellect, Feeling, or Will. 2. The belief in the Past, and the belief in the Future; in what respect they differ from belief in the present. Inseparably implicated with this, if not prior to it and preparatory to it, is the difference between ideas of Memory and ideas of Imagination. 3. The nature of our continuous Mental Life, or Identity; or what is meant by the Permanent Existence of Mind. The chapters on Memory, and on Belief, and the section on Identity (Chap. XIV.), all treat of these questions, and contain profound original views on them all.