Considerations on Representative Government — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
Considerations on Representative Government
John Stuart Mill · en
Instead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit,
the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control
the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel
a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one
considers questionable; to cinsure them if found condemnable, and, if
the men who compose the government abuse their trust, or fulfill it in
a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to
expel them from office, and either expressly or virtually appoint
their successors. This is surely ample power, and security enough for
the liberty of the nation. In addition to this, the Parliament has an
office not inferior even to this in importance; to be at once the
nation's Committee of Grievances and its Congress of Opinions; an
arena in which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that of
every section of it, and, as far as possible, of every eminent
individual whom it contains, can produce itself in full light and
challenge discussion; where every person in the country may count upon
finding somebody who speaks his mind as well or better than he could
speak it himself--not to friends and partisans exclusively, but in the
face of opponents, to be tested by adverse controversy; where those
whose opinion is overruled, feel satisfied that it is heard, and set
aside not by a mere act of will, but for what are thought superior
reasons, and commend themselves as such to the representatives of the
majority of the nation; where every party or opinion in the country
can muster its strength, and be cured of any illusion concerning the
number or power of its adherents; where the opinion which prevails in
the nation makes itself manifest as prevailing, and marshals its hosts
in the presence of the government, which is thus enabled and compelled
to give way to it on the mere manifestation, without the actual
employment of its strength; where statesmen can assure themselves, far
more certainly than by any other signs, what elements of opinion and
power are growing and what declining, and are enabled to shape their
measures with some regard not solely to present exigencies, but to
tendencies in progress. Representative assemblies are often taunted by
their enemies with being places of mere talk and _bavardage_. There
has seldom been more misplaced derision. I know not how a
representative assembly can more usefully employ itself than in talk,
when the subject of talk is the great public interests of the country,
and every sentence of it represents the opinion either of some
important body of persons in the nation, or of an individual in whom
some such body have reposed their confidence. A place where every
interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even
passionately pleaded, in the face of the government and of all other
interests and opinions, can compel them to listen, and either comply,