Principles of Political Economy: Abridged with Critical, Bibliographical, and Explanatory Notes, and a Sketch of the History of Political Economy
John Stuart Mill · en
(2.) “Employment is much more constant,” continues Adam Smith, “in some
trades than in others. In the greater part of manufactures, a journeyman
may be pretty sure of employment almost every day in the year that he is
able to work. A mason or brick-layer, on the contrary, can work neither in
hard frost nor in foul weather, and his employment at all other times
depends upon the occasional calls of his customers. He is liable, in
consequence, to be frequently without any. What he earns, therefore, while
he is employed, must not only maintain him while he is idle, but make him
some compensation for those anxious and desponding moments which the
thought of so precarious a situation must sometimes occasion.”
“When (1) the inconstancy of the employment is combined with (2) the
hardship, disagreeableness, and dirtiness of the work, it sometimes raises
the wages of the most common labor above those of the most skillful
artificers. A collier working by the piece is supposed, at Newcastle, to
earn commonly about double, and in many parts of Scotland about three
times, the wages of common labor. His high wages arise altogether from the
hardship, disagreeableness, and dirtiness of his work. His employment may,
upon most occasions, be as constant as he pleases. The coal-heavers in
London exercise a trade which in hardship, dirtiness, and disagreeableness
almost equals that of colliers; and from the unavoidable irregularity in
the arrivals of coal-ships, the employment of the greater part of them is
necessarily very inconstant. If colliers, therefore, commonly earn double
and triple the wages of common labor, it ought not to seem unreasonable
that coal-heavers should sometimes earn four or five times those wages. In
the inquiry made into their condition a few years ago, it was found that,
at the rate at which they were then paid, they could earn about four times
the wages of common labor in London.”
These inequalities of remuneration, which are supposed to compensate for
the disagreeable circumstances of particular employments, would, under
certain conditions, be natural consequences of perfectly free competition:
and as between employments of about the same grade, and filled by nearly
the same description of people, they are, no doubt, for the most part,
realized in practice.