The eighth Trope is the one based upon relation, from which 135 we conclude to suspend our judgment as to what things are absolutely, in their nature, since every thing is in relation to something else. And we must bear in mind that we use the word _is_ incorrectly, in place of _appears_, meaning to say, every thing _appears_ to be in relation. This is said, however, with two meanings: first, that every thing is in relation to the one who judges, for the external object, _i.e._ the thing judged, appears to be in relation to the judge; the other way is that every thing is in relation to the things considered together with it, as the relation of the right hand to the left. But we 136 came to the conclusion above, that every thing is in relation to something, as for example, to the one judging; each thing appears in relation to this or that animal, and this or that man, and this or that sense, and in certain circumstances; as regards things considered together, also, each thing appears in relation to this or that mixture, and this or that Trope, and this or that composition, quantity and place. And in another way it is possible to conclude that every thing is in relation 137 to something, as follows: does the being in difference differ from the being in relation, or not? If it does not differ, then it is the same as relation; if it does differ, since every thing which differs is in some relation, for it is said to be in relation to that from which it differs, those things which are in a difference are in a relation to something. Now according 138 to the Dogmatics, some beings belong to the highest genera, others to the lowest species, and others to both genera and species at the same time; all of these are in relation to something, therefore every thing is in relation to something. Furthermore, among things, some things are manifest, and others are hidden, as the Dogmatics themselves say, and the things that make themselves known to us are the phenomena, and the things that are made known to us by the phenomena are the hidden things, for according to the Dogmatics, the phenomena are the outward appearance of the unknown; then that which makes known, and that which is made known, are in relation to something; every thing, therefore, is in relation to something. In 139 addition to this, some things are similar to each other, and others are dissimilar, some are equal, and others are unequal. Now these things are in relation to something, therefore every thing is in relation to something, and whoever says that every thing is not in relation to something, himself establishes the fact that every thing is in relation to something, for even in saying that every thing is not in relation to something, he 140 proves it in reference to us, and not in general, by his objections to us. In short, as we have shown that every thing is in relation to something, it is then evident that we shall not