The English Utilitarians, Volume 2 (of 3): James Mill
John Stuart Mill · en
is, should postpone taking a wife, and should not console himself by
taking a mistress. He is to refrain from increasing the illegitimate
as well as from increasing the legitimate population. It is not
surprising that Malthus admits that this check has 'in past ages
operated with inconsiderable force.'[235] In fact Malthus, as a
thoroughly respectable and decent clergyman, manages by talking about
the 'moral restraint' rather to evade than to answer some awkward
problems of conduct; but at the cost of some inconsequence.
But another result of this mode of patching up his argument is more
important. The 'vices of mankind,' he says in an unusually rhetorical
summary of his historical inquiry,[236] 'are active and able ministers
of depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of
destruction, and often finish the dreadful work themselves. But should
they fail in the war of extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics,
pestilence, and plague advance in terrific array, and sweep off their
thousands and ten thousands. Should success still be incomplete,
gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and at one mighty blow
levels the population with the food of the world.' The life of the
race, then, is a struggle with misery; its expansion is constantly
forcing it upon this array of evils; and in proportion to the
elasticity is the severity of the evils which follow. This is not only
a 'gloomy view,' but again seems to suggest that 'vice' is an
alternative to 'misery.' Vices are bad, it would seem, but at least
they obviate the necessity for disease and famine. Malthus probably
suppressed the passage because he thought it liable to this
interpretation. It indicates, however, a real awkwardness, if not
something more, in his exposition. He here speaks as if there was room
for a fixed number of guests at his banquet. Whatever, therefore,
keeps the population to that limit must be so far good. If he had
considered his 'moral check' more thoroughly, he might have seen that
this does not correspond to his real meaning. The 'moral' and the
prudential checks are not really to be contrasted as alternative, but
co-operative. Every population, vicious or virtuous, must of course
proportion its numbers to its means of support. That gives the
prudential check. But the moral check operates by altering the
character of the population itself. From the purely economic point of
view, vice is bad because it lowers efficiency. A lazy, drunken, and
profligate people would starve where an industrious, sober, and honest
people would thrive. The check of vice thus brings the check of misery
into play at an earlier stage. It limits by lowering the vitality and
substituting degeneration for progress. The check, therefore, is
essentially mischievous. Though it does not make the fields barren, it
lowers the power of cultivation. Malthus had recognised this when he
pointed out, as we have seen, that emergence from the savage state