The English Utilitarians, Volume 2 (of 3): James Mill
John Stuart Mill · en
The doctrine approximates, it would seem, to Mill's; but was all the
more unpalatable to him on that account. The agreement implies
plagiarism, and the difference hopeless stupidity. To Mill Bentham was
the legitimate development of Hartley, while to Mackintosh Bentham
was the plausible perverter of Hartley. Mill regarded Mackintosh as a
sophist, whose aim was to mislead honest Utilitarians into the paths
of orthodoxy, and who also ignored the merits of Mill himself. 'It was
Mr. Mill,' he says, 'who first made known the great importance of the
principle of the indissoluble association';[585] 'Mr. Mill' who had
taken up Hartley's speculations and 'prosecuted the inquiry to its
end';[586] 'Mr. Mill' who explained affections and motives and
dispositions;[587] and 'Mr. Mill' who had cleared up mistakes about
classification which 'had done more to perpetuate darkness on the
subject of mind than any other cause, perhaps than all other causes
taken together.'[588] Sir James blundered because he had not read
Mill's book, as he pretended to have done. Mill does not say all this
from vanity; he is simply stating an obvious matter of fact.
Mill's polemic against the Moral Sense theory, even against a moral
sense produced by association, reveals the really critical points of
the true Utilitarian doctrine. Mill would cut down the moral sense
root and branch. The 'moral sense' means a 'particular faculty'
necessary to discern right and wrong. But no particular faculty is
necessary to discern 'utility.'[589] Hence the distinction between the
'criterion' and the 'moral sentiments' is absurd. The utility is not
the 'criterion' of the morality but itself constitutes the morality.
To say that conduct is right, according to the Utilitarians, is the
same thing as to say that it produces happiness. If the moral sense
orders conduct opposed to the criterion, it is so far bad. If it
never orders such conduct, it is superfluous. Happiness, as with
Bentham, is a definite thing--a currency of solid bullion; and
'virtue' means nothing except as calculated in this currency. Mill,
again, like Bentham, regards the 'utility' principle as giving the
sole 'objective' test. The complaint that it sanctions 'expediency' is
a simple fallacy.