The English Utilitarians, Volume 2 (of 3): James Mill
John Stuart Mill · en
In short, the theological position of the Paley school and the
Utilitarian position of 'Philip Beauchamp' start from the common
ground of experience. Religion means the knowledge of certain facts,
which are to be inferred from appropriate evidence. It does not modify
the whole system of thought, but simply adds certain corollaries; and
the whole question is whether the corollaries are or are not proved by
legitimate reasoning. Can we discover heaven and hell as we discovered
America? Can observation of nature reveal to us a supernatural world?'
The first difficulty is that the argument for natural theology has to
rest upon interference, not upon order, and therefore comes into
conflict with the first principles of scientific procedure. The Deity
is revealed not by the rational but by the arbitrary; and the more the
world is explained, the less the proof that he exists, because the
narrower the sphere of his action. Then, as such a Deity, even if
proved, is not proved to be benevolent or moral, we have to rely for
the moral element upon the evidence of 'miracles,' that is, again, of
certain interruptions of order. The scientific tendency more or less
embodied in Protestantism, so far as it appealed to reason or to
'private judgment,' had, moreover, made it necessary to relegate
miracles to a remote period, while denying them at the present. To
prove at once that there are no miracles now, and that there were a
few miracles two thousand years ago, was really hopeless. In fact, the
argument had come to be stated in an artificial form which had no real
relation to the facts. If the apostles had been a jury convinced by a
careful legal examination of the evidence; if they had pronounced
their verdict, in spite of the knowledge that they would be put to
death for finding it, there would have been some force in Paley's
argument. But then they had not. To assume such an origin for any
religion implied a total misconception of the facts. Paley assumed
that the apostles resembled twelve respectable deans of Carlisle
solemnly declaring, in spite of the most appalling threats, that John
Wesley had been proved to have risen from the dead. Paley might
plausibly urge that such an event would require a miracle. But,
meanwhile, his argument appeared to rest the whole case for morality
and religion upon this narrow and perilous base. We can only know that
it is our interest to be moral if we know of heaven and hell; and we
only know of heaven and hell if we accept the evidence of miracles,
and infer that the worker of miracles had supernatural sources of
information. The moral difficulty which emerges is obvious. The Paley
conception of the Deity is, in fact, coincident with Bentham's
conception of the sovereign. He is simply an invisible sovereign,
operating by tremendous sanctions. The sanctions are 'external,' that
is to say, pains and pleasures, annexed to conduct by the volition of
the sovereign, not intrinsic consequences of the conduct itself. Such