The English Utilitarians, Volume 2 (of 3): James Mill
John Stuart Mill · en
The whole argument ignores the simple
consideration that the sovereign is himself in all cases the product
of the society over which he rules, and his whole action, even in the
most despotic governments, determined throughout by organic instincts,
explaining and not ultimately explicable by coercion. Macaulay's
doctrine partially recognises this by falling back upon the Whig
theory of checks and balances, and the mixture of three mysterious
entities, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. But, as Bentham had
sufficiently shown in the _Fragment_, the theory becomes hopelessly
unreal when we try to translate it into facts. There are not three
separate forces, conflicting like three independent forces, but a
complex set of social institutions bound together into a whole. It is
impossible really to regard government as a permanent balance of
antagonistic forces, confronting each other like the three duellists
in Sheridan's _Critic_. The practical result of that theory is to
substitute for the 'greatest happiness' principle the vague criterion
of the preservation of an equilibrium between indefinable forces; and
to make the ultimate end of government the maintenance as long as
possible of a balance resting on no ulterior principle, but
undoubtedly pleasant for the comfortable classes. Nothing is left but
the rough guesswork, which, if a fine name be wanted, may be called
Baconian induction. The 'matchless constitution,' as Bentham calls it,
represents a convenient compromise, and the tendency is to attach
exaggerated importance to its ostensible terms. When Macaulay
asserted against Mill[118] that it was impossible to say which
element--monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy--had gained strength in
England in the last century, he is obviously looking at the formulæ
and not at the social body behind.