The English Utilitarians, Volume 2 (of 3): James Mill
John Stuart Mill · en
_Review_ was at first a mere pastime, occupying such leisure as was
allowed by their professional pursuits. They were indeed men of
liberal sympathies, intelligent and independent enough to hold by a
party which was out of power. They had read Hume and Voltaire and
Rousseau; they had sat at the feet of Dugald Stewart; and were in
sympathy with intellectual liberalism. But they were men who meant to
become judges, members of parliament, or even bishops. Nothing in
their social atmosphere had stimulated the deep resentment against
social injustice which makes the fanatic or the enthusiast. We may
take as their interpreter the Whig philosopher James Mackintosh
(1765-1832), a man of wide reading, both in history and philosophy, an
eloquent orator, and a very able writer. Mackintosh, said
Coleridge,[126] is the 'king of the men of talent'; by which was
intimated that, as a man of talent, he was not, like some people, a
man of genius. Mackintosh, that is, was a man to accept plausible
formulæ and to make them more plausible; not a man to pierce to the
heart of things, or reveal fruitful germs of thought. His intellect
was judicial; given to compromises, affecting a judicious _via media_,
and endeavouring to reconcile antagonistic tendencies. Thoroughgoing
or one-sided thinkers, and Mill in particular, regarded him with
excessive antipathy as a typical representative of the opposite
intellectual tendencies. Mackintosh's political attitude is
instructive. At the outbreak of the French revolution he was a
struggling young Scot, seeking his fortune in London, just turning
from medicine to the bar, and supporting himself partly by journalism.
He became secretary to the Society of the 'Friends of the People,' the
Whig rival of the revolutionary clubs, and in April 1791 sprang into
fame by his _Vindiciæ Gallicæ_. The Whigs had not yet lost the fervour
with which they had welcomed the downfall of the Bastille. Burke's
_Reflections_, the work of a great thinker in a state of irritation
bordering upon frenzy, had sounded the note of alarm. The revolution,
as Burke maintained, was in fact the avatar of a diabolic power. It
meant an attack upon the very organic principles of society. It
therefore implied a complete breach of historical continuity, and a
war against the reverence for 'prescription' and tradition which is
essential to all healthy development. To his extreme opponents the
same theory afforded the justification of the revolution. It meant
that every institution was to be thrown into the crucible, and a new
world to arise governed only by reason. The view very ably defended by
Mackintosh was opposed to both. He looks upon the French revolution as
a more complete application of the principles of Locke and the English
Whigs of 1688. The revolutionists are, as he urges,[127] applying the
principles which had been worked out by the 'philosophers of Europe'
during the preceding century. They were not, as Burke urged,
rejecting experience for theory.