The first idea which occurs to the mind is to make it the duty of the Council to determine who is the aggressor. But, immediately, the question arises whether the Council must decide this question unanimously, or whether a majority vote would suffice. There are serious disadvantages in both solutions and they are therefore unacceptable. To insist upon a unanimous decision of the Council exposes the State attacked to the loss of those definite guarantees to which it is entitled, if one single Member of the Council--be it in good faith or otherwise--insists on adhering to an interpretation of the facts different from that of all his colleagues. It is impossible to admit that the very existence of a nation should be subject to such a hazard. It is not sufficient to point out that {188} the Council would be bound to declare the existence of aggression in an obvious case and that it could not fail to carry out its duty. The duty would be a duty without a sanction and if by any chance the Council were not to do its duty, the State attacked would be deprived of all guarantees. But it would also be dangerous to rely on a majority vote of the Council. In that case, the danger would be incurred by the State called upon to furnish assistance and to support the heavy burden of common action, if it still entertained some doubt as to the guilt of the country against which it had to take action. Such a country would run the risk of having to conform to a decision with which it did not agree. The only escape from this dilemma appeared to lie in some automatic procedure which would not necessarily be based on a decision of the Council. After examining the difficulty and discussing it in all its aspects, the First Committee believes that it has found the solution in the idea of a presumption which shall hold good until the contrary has been established by a unanimous decision of the Council. The Committee is of opinion that this presumption arises in three cases, namely, when a resort to war is accompanied: By a refusal to accept the procedure of pacific settlement or to submit to the decision resulting therefrom; By violation of provisional measures enjoined by the Council as contemplated by Article 7 of the Protocol; Or by disregard of a decision recognising that the dispute arises out of a matter which lies exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the other party and by failure or by refusal to submit the question first to the Council or the Assembly. In these cases, even if there is not absolute certainty, there exists at any rate a very strong presumption which should suffice for the application of sanctions unless proof to the contrary has been furnished by a unanimous decision of the Council. It will be noticed that there is a characteristic difference between the first two cases and the third. {189}