Article 14 is in perfect keeping with the last paragraphs of Articles 10 and 11. In the paragraphs in question, the coming into operation of the sanctions depends upon an injunction by the Council; it therefore also devolves upon the Council to declare that the object for which the sanctions were applied has been attained. Just as the application of the sanctions is a matter for the States, so it rests with them to liquidate the operations undertaken with a view to resisting the act of aggression. _Article 15._ Paragraph 1 is similar to Article 10 of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance drawn up last year. Paragraph 2 is designed to prevent the sanctions provided for in Article 11 from undergoing any change in character during the process of execution and developing into a war of annexation. In view of the observations of various delegations regarding the punishment of the aggressor, it should be added that it would be incorrect to interpret this article as meaning that the only penalties to be apprehended by the aggressor as the result of his act shall be the burdens referred to in paragraph 1. If {206} necessary, securities against fresh aggression, or pledges guaranteeing the fulfilment of the obligations imposed in accordance with paragraph 1, might be required. Only annexation of territory and measures involving the loss of political independence are declared inadmissible. "Territory" is to be taken to mean the whole territory of a State, no distinction being made between the mother-country and the colonies. 5.--REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. _Articles 17 and 21._ Although it has not been possible to solve the problem of the reduction of armaments in the clauses of the document submitted to the Assembly for approval, our work paves the way to it and makes it possible. The reduction of armaments will result, in the first place, from the general security created by a diminution of the dangers of war arising from the compulsory pacific settlement of all disputes. It will also ensue from the certainty which any State attacked will have of obtaining the economic and financial support of all the signatory States, and such support would be especially important should the aggressor be a great Power, capable of carrying on a long war. Nevertheless, for States which, owing to their geographical position, are especially liable to attack, and for States whose most important centres are adjacent to their frontiers, the dangers of a sudden attack are so great that it will not be possible for them to base any plan for the reduction of their armaments simply upon the political and economic factors referred to above, no matter what the importance of such factors may be.