The Judicial Murder of Mary E. Surratt — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The Judicial Murder of Mary E. Surratt
John Stuart Mill · en
That the petition for commutation was a device of the Triumvirate of
prosecutors to secure the coveted death-sentence, employed in reliance
upon the temporary ascendency of the chief of the three over the
beleaguered President, and upon the momentary pliability, heedlessness,
or, it may be, semi-stupefaction of the successor of the murdered Lincoln,
to smother the offensive prayer:--such an hypothesis alone seems adequate
in any degree to reconcile the apparent contradictions, clear up the
perplexities and solve the mysteries, which hang around this dark affair.
It furnishes the only rational answer to the else insoluble question, how
it happened that a court, a majority of whose members had the inclination
and the power to lower the punishment of the solitary woman before them to
life-long imprisonment, as the court did with the three men who were tried
with her and convicted of the same crime, did nevertheless, by at least a
two-thirds vote, condemn her to die by the rope.
It lights up the else inscrutable prohibition by Stanton of a public
exculpation of his subordinate officer, softened by the sardonic
admonition "to rely" for justification "on the final judgment of the
people." A source of glorification, rather, it should be, that no maudlin
pity for a woman had been suffered to intercept the death-stroke of a
righteous vengeance.
It accounts for the "scrupulous obedience" of Bingham, not only until
Stanton's death, but three years after, until Seward, too, had gone.
Stanton knew the petition had been suppressed or made invisible; Seward,
that the petition never had been before the Cabinet.
It throws a glimmer, faint it is true, on the shameful attitude of Speed,
eight years after the death of Johnson--still shutting his ears to the
repeated appeals of his agonized friend, and still falling back on his
propriety. According to Judge Harlan, the whole record had been examined
by the Attorney-General, as well as the Secretary of War. Speed, too,
under the spell of Stanton, may have fingered the obnoxious paper, which
might nip the bloody consummate flower of his "_common law of war_."
It furnishes the only plausible reason why such an historic document did
not appear in the published official record of the proceedings of the
Military Commission, in November, 1865, or in the reports of the
Judge-Advocate, first, to the President, and, second, to the Congress.
It illumines with a baleful light the atmosphere of sinister secrecy, in
which this adjunct to the record, for no lawful reason, has been
enshrouded; the mysterious incidents at the Surratt trial, such as the
tardy and reluctant production, the faltering and imperfect exhibition,
and the hasty withdrawal of the "roll of papers;" the two statements of
Mr. Pierrepont; the shrinking of the "full Cabinet meeting" into a
"confidential interview," until after Seward's death; and the singularly
equivocal language that the petition was "_before the President_" when he
signed the warrant.