Bonaparte at once became perfectly aware not only of the Austrian
position, but also of the favorable opportunity it opened for him. His
ideas began immediately to expand and change. Why not take advantage
of the time which must intervene before the Austrians could
concentrate for a decisive action, leave Masséna to hold Genoa a few
days longer, himself march to Milan and secure Lombardy, then cross
the Po, and, after having cut off all Melas's connections, offer him
battle? That a single battle might decide the fate of Italy was the
conception of a strategist. The inverse order of defeating Melas,
relieving Genoa, taking Milan, and driving the enemy behind the Adda,
would have meant a long campaign. This was the first appearance of
this keen conception, which recurs twice more in Napoleon's life--in
1809 and in 1813.
Before the end of the month every portion of the army had done its
work. Turreau was over Mont Cenis, and had driven in the Austrian
guards. Moncey had passed the St. Gotthard in safety, and was ready at
Bellinzona. A side column under Bethencourt had crossed the Simplon
and was near Domo d'Ossola. On June second the united French force had
crossed the Ticino in safety, and the vanguard entered Milan as the
Austrian garrison withdrew first to Lodi and then to Crema. Murat was
despatched with his cavalry to drive the retreating columns so far
that they could not interfere with the next serious operation, the
crossing of the Po. Bonaparte celebrated his return not only by the
reëstablishment of the Cisalpine Republic and by great civic
festivals, but by a religious solemnity at which he declared his
respect for the Holy Father and his attachment to the faith. The great
cathedral was his special charge. Among the statues of saints which
adorn its myriad pinnacles, one of the best is his own portrait.
CHAPTER XVI[17]
[Footnote 17: References as before. The memoirs of Bourrienne
are a publisher's enterprise, valuable in many places when
controlled by other authorities: but for this period they are
untrustworthy, as are those of Marbot. The memoirs of
Antommarchi have little value except as he corroborates more
authentic statements by others. Roederer's works are
specially valuable for this period. Further, see Hüffer:
Quellen zu 1799-1800; Sargent: Campaign of Marengo, Relation
de Neipperg; Vivenot: Thugut, Clerfayt und Wurmser; Fournier:
Skizzen; Du Casse: Négociations de Lunéville; Bowman:
Preliminary Stages of Peace of Amiens; Pajol: Kléber, sa vie,
sa correspondance.]
MARENGO