The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. Vol. 2 (of 4) — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. Vol. 2 (of 4)
John Stuart Mill · en
Napoleon's generals, whose ability was as remarkable as the feebleness
of his admirals, were interested, as their own memoirs and those of
other keen observers prove, in an empire of Europe by which their
dignities were to be perpetuated and strengthened. Joseph told the
Prussian minister that his brother's strength with the army was in
the new laurels which they hoped to pluck, and in the wealth which
would follow as a result. The Emperor had revealed the truth to his
favorite brother when he said that he himself would never attempt a
landing on British shores, but that he might send Ney to Ireland. It
is perhaps a significant straw that when Robert Fulton, as tradition
asserts, offered to make the flotilla independent of wind and wave by
the use of steam, Napoleon, the apostle of science, friend of Monge
and Volney, member of the Institute, displayed very little scientific
interest. For some time past he had been coquetting with the great
American inventor, granting him inadequate subsidies to prosecute his
schemes for applying steam-power to various marine engines of
destruction. It must, however, be remembered that there is no proof of
actual negotiations between the two for the application of steam to
navigation. The Emperor probably intended to keep others from using
Fulton's inventions; that he made no fair trial of them himself would
seem to show that he had no real use for them.
Most English historians have believed that Napoleon's forecast saw a
successful invasion of their country, and Great Britain as a
consequence disgorging a vast war indemnity wherewith his invincible
legions could be recruited and the continental powers could be reduced
to subjection. Englishmen have always felt that it was a deed of high
enterprise for Britons to overawe the Corsican ogre by the magnitude
of their preparations to resist him, and have by constant iteration
convinced large numbers that this among other honors is also theirs.
They have rarely considered the anxiety of the other side lest English
troops should be landed on the Continent under the protection of such
an overwhelming sea-power as Great Britain possessed. It will, of
course, never be known how serious the Emperor's much-paraded purpose
was during 1803 and 1804. But a more significant sign even than those
already enumerated is the fact that in January, 1805, while the
council of state was discussing the budget, he declared that for two
years France had been making tremendous sacrifices. "A general war on
the Continent," he said, "would demand no greater. I now have the
strongest possible army, a complete military organization, and am this
moment on the footing which I generally have first to secure in case
of actual war. To raise such forces in time of peace--twenty thousand
artillery, horses and trains complete--there was need of a pretext in
order to levy and bring them all together without rousing suspicion in
the other continental powers. This pretext was afforded by the project