The military reorganization of Austria was already complete, and
Metternich wrote on July twenty-sixth, 1807, to Stadion, the minister
of state, that as the peace of Tilsit had sown broadcast the germs of
its own destruction, the wisdom of his correspondent's administration
would one day bring Austria to the point where three hundred thousand
men united under one will and directed to one goal would play the
first role in Europe, "in a moment of universal anarchy, at one of
those epochs which always follow great usurpations, and wipe out the
traces of the conquerors; an epoch of which no one can foretell the
date, but which nothing postpones except the life of a single man, and
which all the genius of that man can so much the less postpone as he
has not yet taken the first step to preclude its certain results."
This reference to Napoleon's childlessness and the dependence of his
system on his single life is clear enough. The Emperor of the French
was himself thoroughly aware of the influence exerted by such a
consideration upon the course of affairs, and in consequence his
dealing with Francis was somewhat less peremptory than that with
Frederick William. Nevertheless, the results were exceedingly
humiliating to Austria's pride. In a treaty concluded at Fontainebleau
on October tenth, 1807, with reference to the Italian frontier, her
dominions were shorn to the quick. At Napoleon's suggestion, Count
Starhemberg, her ambassador in London, intimated that England, in the
interest of peace, ought to restore the Danish fleet and make terms
with France. On the prompt refusal of Great Britain to listen, the
envoy withdrew from London; but he did not leave the English cabinet
in doubt as to the cause. He knew and broadly hinted that though his
master dared not trifle with a Franco-Russian alliance, his heart was
with the English cause. To all outward appearance, therefore, Austria
was quite as subservient as Prussia to the mighty coalition of
France and Russia.