Early Greek Philosophy & Other Essays: Collected Works, Volume Two — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
Early Greek Philosophy & Other Essays: Collected Works, Volume Two
Nietzsche · en
Whilst the imagination of Heraclitus measured the restlessly moving
universe, the "actuality" (_Wirklichkeit_), with the eye of the happy
spectator, who sees innumerable pairs wrestling in joyous combat
entrusted to the superintendence of severe umpires, a still higher
presentiment seized him, he no longer could contemplate the wrestling
pairs and the umpires, separated one from another; the very umpires
seemed to fight, and the fighters seemed to be their own judges--yea,
since at the bottom he conceived only of the one Justice eternally
swaying, he dared to exclaim: "The contest of The Many is itself pure
justice. And after all: The One is The Many. For what are all those
qualities according to their nature? Are they immortal gods? Are they
separate beings working for themselves from the beginning and without
end? And if the world which we see knows only Becoming and Passing but
no Permanence, should perhaps those qualities constitute a differently
fashioned metaphysical world, true, not a world of unity as Anaximander
sought behind the fluttering veil of plurality, but a world of eternal
and essential pluralities?" Is it possible that however violently he
had denied such duality, Heraclitus has after all by a round-about way
accidentally got into the dual cosmic order, an order with an Olympus
of numerous immortal gods and demons,--viz., _many_ realities,--and
with a human world, which sees only the dust-cloud of the Olympic
struggle and the flashing of divine spears,--_i.e.,_ only a Becoming?
Anaximander had fled just from these definite qualities into the lap of
the metaphysical "Indefinite"; because the former _became_ and passed,
he had denied them a true and essential existence; however should it
not seem now as if the Becoming is only the looming-into-view of a
struggle of eternal qualities? When we speak of the Becoming, should
not the original cause of this be sought in the peculiar feebleness of
human cognition--whereas in the nature of things there is perhaps no
Becoming, but only a co-existing of many true increate indestructible
realities?
These are Heraclitean loop-holes and labyrinths; he exclaims once
again: "The 'One' is the 'Many'." The many perceptible qualities are
neither eternal entities, nor phantasmata of our senses (Anaxagoras
conceives them later on as the former, Parmenides as the latter),
they are neither rigid, sovereign "Being" nor fleeting Appearance
hovering in human minds. The third possibility which alone was left
to Heraclitus nobody will be able to divine with dialectic sagacity
and as it were by calculation, for what he invented here is a rarity
even in the realm of mystic incredibilities and unexpected cosmic
metaphors.--The world is the _Game_ of Zeus, or expressed more
physically, the game of fire with itself, the "One" is only in this
sense at the same time the "Many."--