Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 1: Complete Works, Volume Six
Nietzsche · en
THROWING SUSPICION ON MORALITY FOR FAITH'S SAKE.--No power can be
maintained when it is only represented by hypocrites; no matter how
many "worldly" elements the Catholic Church possesses, its strength
lies in those still numerous priestly natures who render life hard
and full of meaning for themselves, and whose glance and worn bodies
speak of nocturnal vigils, hunger, burning prayers, and perhaps even of
scourging; these move men and inspire them with fear. What if it were
_necessary_ to live thus? This is the terrible question which their
aspect brings to the lips. Whilst they spread this doubt they always
uprear another pillar of their power; even the free-thinker does not
dare to withstand such unselfishness with hard words of truth, and to
say, "Thyself deceived, deceive not others!" Only the difference of
views divides them from him, certainly no difference of goodness or
badness; but men generally treat unjustly that which they do not like.
Thus we speak of the cunning and the infamous art of the Jesuits, but
overlook the self-control which every individual Jesuit practises, and
the fact that the lightened manner of life preached by Jesuit books
is by no means for their benefit, but for that of the laity. We may
even ask whether, with precisely similar tactics and organisation,
we enlightened ones would make equally good tools, equally admirable
through self-conquest, indefatigableness, and renunciation.
56.
VICTORY OF KNOWLEDGE OVER RADICAL EVIL.--It is of great advantage to
him who desires to be wise to have witnessed for a time the spectacle
of a thoroughly evil and degenerate man; it is false, like the contrary
spectacle, but for whole long periods it held the mastery, and its
roots have even extended and ramified themselves to us and our world.
In order to understand _ourselves_ we must understand _it_ but then, in
order to mount higher we must rise above it. We recognise, then, that
there exist no sins in the metaphysical sense; but, in the same sense,
also no virtues; we recognise that the entire domain of ethical ideas
is perpetually tottering, that there are higher and deeper conceptions
of good and evil, of moral and immoral. He who does not desire much
more from things than a knowledge of them easily makes peace with his
soul, and will make a mistake (or commit a sin, as the world calls
it) at the most from ignorance, but hardly from covetousness. He will
no longer wish to excommunicate and exterminate desires; but his
only, his wholly dominating ambition, to _know_ as well as possible
at all times, will make him cool and will soften all the savageness
in his disposition. Moreover, he has been freed from a number of
tormenting conceptions, he has no more feeling at the mention of the
words "punishments of hell," "sinfulness," "incapacity for good," he
recognises in them only the vanishing shadow-pictures of false views of
the world and of life.
57.