Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2
Nietzsche · en
There is no sure guiding instinct for the former or the
latter. Rather must we boldly face the great task of preparing the earth
for a plant of the most ample and joyous fruitfulness—a task set by reason
to reason!
190.
THE PRAISE OF DISINTERESTEDNESS AND ITS ORIGIN.—Between two neighbouring
chieftains there was a long-standing quarrel: they laid waste each other’s
territories, stole cattle, and burnt down houses, with an indecisive
result on the whole, because their power was fairly equal. A third, who
from the distant situation of his property was able to keep aloof from
these feuds, yet had reason to dread the day when one of the two
neighbours should gain a decisive preponderance, at last intervened
between the combatants with ceremonial goodwill. Secretly he lent a heavy
weight to his peace proposal by giving either to understand that he would
henceforth join forces with the other against the one who strove to break
the peace. They met in his presence, they hesitatingly placed into his
hand the hands that had hitherto been the tools and only too often the
causes of hatred—and then they really and seriously tried to keep the
peace. Either saw with astonishment how suddenly his prosperity and his
comfort increased; how he now had as neighbour a dealer ready to buy and
sell instead of a treacherous or openly scornful evil-doer; how even, in
unforeseen troubles, they could reciprocally save each other from
distress, instead of, as before, making capital out of this distress of
his neighbour and enhancing it to the highest degree. It even seemed as if
the human type had improved in both countries, for the eyes had become
brighter, the forehead had lost its wrinkles; all now felt confidence in
the future—and nothing is more advantageous for the souls and bodies of
men than this confidence. They saw each other every year on the
anniversary of the alliance, the chieftains as well as their retinue, and
indeed before the eyes of the mediator, whose mode of action they admired
and revered more and more, the greater the profit that they owed to him
became. Then his mode of action was called _disinterested_. They had
looked far too fixedly at the profit they had reaped themselves hitherto
to see anything more of their neighbour’s method of dealing than that his
condition in consequence of this had not altered so much as their own; he
had rather remained the same: and thus it appeared that the former had not
had his profit in view. For the first time people said to themselves that
disinterestedness was a virtue. It is true that in minor private matters
similar circumstances had arisen, but men only had eyes for this virtue
when it was depicted on the walls in a large script that was legible to
the whole community. Moral qualities are not recognised as virtues,
endowed with names, held in esteem, and recommended as worthy of
acquisition until the moment when they have _visibly_ decided the
happiness and destiny of whole societies.