Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2
Nietzsche · en
_The Wanderer_: Perhaps you are wrong, my friend! Hitherto they have
observed in my views more of the shadow than of me.
_The Shadow_: More of the shadow than of the light? Is that possible?
_The Wanderer_: Be serious, dear fool! My very first question demands
seriousness.
1.
OF THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE.—Probability, but no truth; the semblance of
freedom, but no freedom—these are the two fruits by virtue of which the
tree of knowledge cannot be confounded with the tree of life.
2.
THE WORLD’S REASON.—That the world is _not_ the abstract essence of an
eternal reasonableness is sufficiently proved by the fact that that _bit
of the world_ which we know—I mean our human reason—is none too
reasonable. And if _this_ is not eternally and wholly wise and reasonable,
the rest of the world will not be so either. Here the conclusion _a minori
ad majus, a parte ad totum_ holds good, and that with decisive force.
3.
“IN THE BEGINNING WAS.”—To glorify the origin—that is the metaphysical
after-shoot which sprouts again at the contemplation of history, and
absolutely makes us imagine that _in the beginning_ of things lies all
that is most valuable and essential.
4.
STANDARD FOR THE VALUE OF TRUTH.—The difficulty of climbing mountains is
no gauge of their height. Yet in the case of science it is different!—we
are told by certain persons who wish to be considered “the initiated,”—the
difficulty in finding truth is to determine the value of truth! This
insane morality originates in the idea that “truths” are really nothing
more than gymnastic appliances, with which we have to exercise ourselves
until we are thoroughly tired. It is a morality for the athletes and
gymnasts of the intellect.
5.